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Abstract 
Background 
Effective health system reform requires support from health care professionals. However, many 
studies show an increasing discontent among health care professionals toward certain 
government policies. When professionals resist implementing policies, this may have serious 
consequences for policy effectiveness. 
Objective 
To develop and test a model for explaining resistance of health professionals to implement 
policies, based on three dimensions: societal benefits (such as improving efficiency), patient 
benefits (such as improving quality for individual patients) and personal benefits for professionals 
(for example increased income or fewer administrative burdens). 
Methods 
We conduct a survey among 1,317 Dutch psychologists, psychotherapists and psychiatrists in 
2010 who had to implement a new policy: Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). The dependent 
variable is professionals’ resistance to implement these DRGs. As independent variables we 
develop scales to measure perceived societal benefits, patient benefits and personal benefits. 
Socio-demographic variables are also included. 
Results 
The model worked adequately in that the three benefit dimensions, together with control 
variables, explained 43% of the variance in resistance to implement DRGs. Results indicate that 
health professionals were overall quite resistant towards the policy. The main reason was 
widespread belief that DRGs neither contribute to care quality nor help to control costs (low 
societal benefits). Resistance can also be explained by fears for one’s personal status, income, 
and administrative burdens. Professionals furthermore doubt whether the policy is beneficial for 
patients, although this dimension is the least influential, which was unexpected. Perceived effects 
on patient choice, furthermore, does not contribute to willingness or resistance to work with 
DRGs. These insights can help in understanding why health care professionals embrace or resist 
the implementation of particular policies. 
Key words: Health care professionals, policy implementation, resistance to change, policy 
benefits, Diagnosis Related Groups 
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EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS’ RESISTANCE TO IMPLEMENT DIAGNOSIS 
RELATED GROUPS: (NO) BENEFITS FOR SOCIETY, PATIENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 
Introduction 
In health care management literature, there is an intense debate concerning the pressures health 
care professionals face in service delivery [1-3]. This debate often focuses on the implementation 
of new policies [4, 5]. Professionals often appear to be resistant to implement new policies, which 
focus on reducing health care costs and increase transparency. For example, Bottery [6], 
examining the pressures on British health care professionals stemming from new policies, notes 
that “they [professionals] are now reduced to (as they see it) to being mere functionaries in a 
larger institutional and managerial scheme”. 
Policy research has shown increasing discontent among health care professionals 
toward government policies [7, 8]. When they resist implementing policies, this may have serious 
consequences. Sabatier [9], for example, states as one of the necessary conditions for effective 
implementation “committed and skillful implementers who apply themselves to using their 
discretion so as to realize policy objectives”. In a similar vein, Ewalt & Jennings [10] note that “It 
is clear from the literature there is much that members of an organization can do to stymie policy 
implementation.” The quality of interactions between professionals and patients may also be 
affected by low commitment to new policies [11]. Health care professionals may sometimes have 
good reasons to resist new government policies, especially when they see little value in the 
policy for their patients or the health system. Alternatively, they may resist new policies for more 
personal reasons, such as worsening working conditions. 
In this study, we focus on the resistance of mental health care professionals to use 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). We use a 2010 survey among 1,317 Dutch psychologists, 
psychotherapists and psychiatrists. We first describe the introduction of Diagnosis Related 
Groups in Dutch (mental) health care and the resistance against this development. We then 
discuss the theoretical framework, considering the relationships between the perceived benefits 
of a new policy and resistance to implement this policy. Hereafter, we describe the method and 
approach for conducting our survey, as well as its results. We conclude by discussing the 
contribution of this article to the understanding of health care professionals’ attitudes towards 
policies based on Diagnosis Related Groups, and towards health care policies in general. 
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Resistance against Diagnosis Related Groups in Dutch mental health care  
The introduction of DRGs in Dutch mental health care is part of a larger trend towards the use of 
DRGs. In the early 1980s, DRGs were developed in the USA to calculate cost prices for health 
“products“ in hospitals. This was an attempt to improve transparency and control costs. Since 
then, variants of the DRG-policy have been developed in a number of countries, such as 
Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and China [12, 13]. DRG-
policies are used to categorize patients according to their case-mix (type of patient, their 
treatment and associated costs).  
While there have been a number of studies on the attitudes of health professionals in 
general [14] and attitudes towards health care reforms [15-18], only a small number of academic 
studies have concentrated on attitudes towards DRGs. One of these studies is of Tzavaras et al. 
[19], who surveyed hospital and health administrators and health officials in Greece and found 
that respondents generally had favorable attitudes and mainly mentioned practical stumbling 
blocks to using DRGs. Thibadoux et al. [20] organized in-depth interviews with practicing 
physicians in the US, which revealed physicians’ main concerns with DRGs were ethics and 
implementation-related issues. Both studies were, unlike ours, based on relatively small samples 
and were organized prior to the implementation of DRGs. 
In 2005, the Netherlands introduced Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs, Diagnose 
Behandeling Combinaties, DBC’s) in hospital care, in order to improve transparency and quality, 
by defining products which can be negotiated between purchasers and providers of care. The 
Dutch DRG-policy for somatic care differs on a number of aspects from typical DRG-policies [21]. 
First, in a typical DRG-policy there is a DRG for every hospital admission or outpatient contact, 
while DRGs in Dutch somatic care stretch from the first contact with a physician to the 
completion of the treatment. Second, the Dutch DRG-policy is used for both registering activity 
and payment, while other DRG-policies only focus on measuring activity. Furthermore, it is a very 
detailed policy, with over 30.000 DRGs, while a typical DRG-policy covers less than 3000 DRGs 
[21].  
In 2007, the Netherlands introduced DRGs in mental health care to improve 
transparency about quality and price of care, and to allow for efficiency savings [22]. This policy 
is partly based on the DRG-policy in somatic care. It also stretches from first patient contact to 
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completion and payment of the treatment. However, it is far less detailed. For instance, there are 
only 92 DRGs for outpatient mental health care. This was based on the experiences that the very 
detailed way the somatic DRG-policy was structured was ineffective [23].  
The DRG-policy in mental health care were recorded in national rules and regulations. 
More specifically, this concerns Reading MC-U-2803757, based on article 7 of the Law on Health 
Market Organization.This was part of a process to convert the Dutch health care system into one 
based on a regulated market [24]. The old system meant that the more sessions a professional 
caregiver (a psychologist, psychiatrist, or psychotherapist) had with a patient, the more 
recompense that could be claimed (a fee-for-service system). This system was considered by 
some to be inefficient [12, 24]. The DRG-policy changed the situation by stipulating a standard 
rate for each disorder, such as a mild depression.  
The system of DRG-based payment in the Netherlands requires several administrative 
steps before actual payment takes place [25]. First, when a professional caregiver meets a 
patient, the professional diagnoses the patient: the diagnosis (such as a mild depression or 
bipolar disorder) and the type of care needed (such as inclusion in a mental health care 
organization or clinical treatment), are indicated. Second, this diagnosis is registered at the 
national organization ‘DRG Maintenance’ (DBC Onderhoud). After this, the treatment can start. 
All activities which are done in relationship to the patient are registered, including direct time 
(such as a face-to-face session) and indirect time (such as administration). Fourth, after the 
treatment is finished, the DRG code is sent to the organization DRG Maintenance, in order to 
validate it. They check for among else technical errors (such as missing dates on timesheets). 
Fifth, after validation, the DRG is invoiced at the health care insurer. Some specifics of the DRG 
(such as its product group, for example anxiety disorders) have to be sent along to the health 
care insurer. Sixth, the health care insurer will pay the health care provider. When the health care 
professional has a private practice, he will get paid directly. When the health care professional is 
part of a larger organization, the organization will get paid. 
The implementation of DRG-policy encountered considerable resistance. Dutch mental 
health professionals established associations agitating against DRG-policy, such as “The 
Foundation of DRG-free Practices”. Health care professionals also launched a number of 
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websites to voice their concerns about the DRG-policy.
1
 Demonstrations against DRGs have 
taken place in 2008, and new demonstrations are being announced [26]. 
Mental health professionals seem to have a number of concerns with the DRG-policy. 
First, some note that the DRG-policy is not beneficial for their patients, as it undermines their 
privacy. To function as a price and payment system, the DRG-policy requires information about 
patients to be sent to insurers [22]. Second, some professionals feel that the Diagnosis Statistical 
Manual IV (DSM-IV) as a system for classifying the diagnosis of patients (for instance a mild 
depression or an anxiety disorder) is erroneous. They note that the DSM-IV is a classification 
system, which is very different from a diagnosis system. Third, professionals seem to have 
problems with the administrative workload that comes with the DRG-policy. Hence, it is not 
beneficial for themselves. Registering DRGs and entering information takes up a lot of time, in 
some instances even 20% of the available working time for the professional [27].  
Many professionals seem to be unwilling to implement the DRG-policy. Protest against 
the DRG-policy has received considerable attention in the media, and through some general 
polls. The Foundation of DRG-free Practices in 2007 surveyed 321 psychotherapists and 313 
psychiatrists. Three quarters of respondents considered DRGs a threat to patient privacy [27]. In 
2008 the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) held a survey among 2,271 psychologists, psychotherapists 
and psychiatrists, using snowball sampling [28]. It found that as many as 9 out of 10 
professionals wanted to abandon the DRG policy. The political nature of the latter survey, 
however, requires us to treat these findings with care. Still, an overall picture of broad resistance 
against DRGs among mental health professionals emerges. 
 
Materials and Methods 
The studies summarised in the previous section tend to be descriptive rather than explanatory, 
and are not representative by design. We organised a large-scale representative survey (2010) 
among mental health professionals (psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychotherapists) 
implementing the DRG-policy in the Netherlands to explore the reasons why they resisted this 
policy.  
                                                     
1
 Examples are www.dbcvrij.nl, www.devrijepsych.nl and www.deggzlaatvanzichhoren.nl. www.dbcvrij.nl is also available 
in English. 
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Model 
In order to analyze the resistance of health care professionals against the DRG-policy, we will 
build on among else change management literature. This literature claims fairly unambiguously 
that a crucial condition for success is that employees do not resist the implementation of the 
change [29]. Metselaar [30] defines this change willingness as “a positive behavioral intention 
towards the implementation of modifications in an organization’s structure, or work and 
administrative processes, resulting in efforts from the organization member's side to support or 
enhance the change process.” In this study, we use the ‘willingness/resistance to change’ 
concept, as developed by Metselaar [30], to study the willingness of professionals to implement a 
new public policy. This concept builds upon the seminal theory of planned behavior [31] and, 
further, its measurement has been validated in earlier research. 
We examine whether the benefits of a policy, as perceived by professionals, influences 
the resistance of these professionals to implement public policies. Earlier research suggests a 
strong relationship between the benefits of a policy – as perceived by professionals – and their 
willingness to implement it [32, 33]. Some prominent scholars have emphasized the crucial role 
of the resistance/willingness of professionals to implement a policy [34, 35]. However, few have 
developed and tested a systematic explanatory framework [36].  
In this article, we therefore take the novel approach to construct and test a model for 
analyzing the willingness of health care professionals to implement government policies. We 
develop a model with dimensions of perceived benefits of a new policy as determinants of 
general willingness to implement a policy, or resistance to do so. Three dimensions of benefits 
can be derived from research [34, 37-39]: benefits of the policy for society (societal benefits, 
such as cost reduction or higher quality care); patient benefits (such as higher quality of service); 
and personal benefits for the professionals themselves (such as higher income, status, or fewer 
administrative burdens).  
When professionals feel that a policy is not valuable for society or for their own patients, 
we expect them to be more likely to resist it [40]. For instance, when health care professionals 
have the feeling that a policy will harm the privacy or wellbeing of their patients, this will increase 
their resistance [22]. Next to this, we expect that the more professionals feel that a policy does 
not have added value for themselves, the more resistant they will be to implement it [38]. In sum, 
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we analyze if (and if so, to what degree) a) perceived societal benefits, b) perceived patient 
benefits and c) perceived personal benefits influence the resistance of health care professionals 
to implement the DRG-policy. For instance, when professionals feel that the DRG-policy has no 
benefits for society, will they be more likely to resist it (and if so, how influential is this)?  
Sampling and data collection 
Our sampling frame consisted of 5,199 professionals who were members of two nationwide 
mental health care associations. These were all the members of these associations who could, in 
principle, be working with the DRG policy. The sampling frame did not provide information on 
whether the professionals worked with the policy or not. A number of professionals indicated that 
they did not work with the DRG policy, making them unsuitable for further analyses. Using an 
email and two reminders, we received 1,317 returns of our questionnaire from professionals who 
worked with the DRG-policy; a response of 25%. 
The gender composition of the respondent group was 66% female, which is consistent 
with the Dutch average (69%) for mental health care professionals [28]. The respondents’ 
average age was slightly higher than that of the mental health care professional population (48 
against 44). To rule out a possible non-response bias, we conducted non-response research 
where we contacted the non-responders for their reasons for not participating. Common reasons 
for not participating were a lack of time, retirement, change of occupation or not working with the 
(mental health care) DRGs (some organizations, including some hospitals, were not yet working 
with this policy). The large number of respondents, their characteristics in terms of gender and 
age and the results of the non-response research indicate that our respondents are a good 
representation of the population.  
Measures and scales 
Items were used to measure the dependent and independent variables. For instance, one item 
for perceived patient benefits was “With the DRG-policy I can better solve the problems of my 
patients”. Unless stated otherwise, all items were formatted using five-point Likert scales 
(possible answer categories to an item: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly 
disagree). For some items, we used templates. Templates allow the researcher to specify an 
item by replacing general phrases with more specific ones that better fit the research context. 
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Two templates are used: policy and policy goal. Instead of stating ‘the policy’ or ‘the policy goal’, 
the researcher can rephrase these items using the specific policy and specific goals which the 
policy pursues. This makes it easier for professionals to understand items, as they are better 
tailored to their context and this increases reliability and content validity [41]. 
The items for the questionnaire are shown in the Appendix (in total 21 items). The 
template items are shown in underlined type. This makes it easier to use the items in subsequent 
research, not related to DRGs. 
 
Resistance to implement 
We measured resistance to implement using Metselaar’s validated scale [30]. The Cronbach’s α 
was .85 in this study. 
 
Perceived benefits of DRGs 
We conducted a series of five expert interviews with mental health care specialists and four with 
quantitative methodologists to construct items for the three dimensions of benefits. Using factor 
analyses and reliability analyses, these were subsequently transformed into scales.  
 First, we will analyze the benefits for society. Societal benefits captures the perception of 
professionals concerning the value of the policy to socially relevant goals. We distinguish 
between two sets of policy goals: (1) care quality and efficiency and (2) patient choice. We 
developed items to measure these attitudes (4 items per goal)
2
. Cronbach’s α is .96 for the first 
set, .97 for the second. 
For the scale on perceived benefits of the DRG-policy on patients, five items were used. 
Cronbach’s α of this scale is .80. 
The personal benefits scale measures the professionals’ perceptions of the added value 
of the policy for themselves. This scale is based on the personal valence scale of Holt [38] and 
consist of seven items. Cronbach’s α of this scale is .76. 
                                                     
2
 Based on the factor analyses and suggestions of mental health care experts, we have merged the goals of 
care quality and efficiency in one scale. So for societal benefits there is one scale of 8 items (care quality 
and efficiency), and one scale of 4 items (client choice). 
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Individual characteristics 
We included commonly used individual characteristics: gender, age and whether the respondent 
occupies a management position (yes/no). Further, we included a variable showing whether a 
professional works for an organization (to some extent) or in a private practice, since 
professionals working independently may have different experiences with DRGs. We also 
distinguish between psychiatrists and others, because the former belong to the medical 
profession, while the latter (psychologists and psychotherapists) are non-medical professionals. 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. Scales range from 1-10 to ease interpretation 
(middle=5.5). Assessed against the official policy objectives (higher care quality and lower costs, 
more patient choice), we see a widespread negative assessment of DRGs. For instance, the 
average score for increased quality and lower costs of care is 3.5. In general, professionals do 
not expect that the use of DRGs will improve quality or lower costs. 
Opinions about DRGs’ effects on increasing patient choice are even more dramatic, 
averaging just 2.9! However, this overall negative assessment of DRGs’ expected effects does 
vary significantly across age, gender, and professional groups though. For instance, psychiatrists 
are significantly more negative than the group of psychologists and psychotherapists, across all 
dimensions.  
When asked about the effects of the DRG-policy on their patients, mental health care 
professionals appear to be generally negative, with an average score of 3.3. Respondents 
indicate that they don’t know how their patients can in the short term benefit from DRG policies, 
and state that they do not think DRG-policies are beneficial to their patients’ welfare. 
Furthermore, we see that - on average - professionals feel that the DRG-policy will not be 
beneficial to them personally, reflected in a score of a 4.2. Lastly, we see that the average score 
on resistance to implement the DRG policy is quite high: 6.7. This means that mental health 
professionals in our sample are generally not willing to implement the policy. In the next section, 
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we test the developed model to explain this resistance by looking at the three dimensions of 
benefits (societal, patient, personal) and background variables. 
  
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable Mean SD Cronbachs 
α 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Sex (0=male; 
1=female) 
60.9% n.a. n.a. 1                     
2. Age 48.4 10.74 n.a. -.327** 1                   
3. Psychiatrist 46.3% n.a. n.a. -.271** .218** 1                 
4. Working only in 
institution 
66.5% n.a. n.a. .148** -.312** -.012 1               
5. Working partly in 
institution, partly in 
private practice 
17.9% n.a. n.a. -.131** .147** .056 -.658** 1             
6. Managing position 47.10% n.a. n.a. -.246** .173** .375** .065* .077* 1           
7. Societal benefit: 
Increasing care 
quality & efficiency 
3.48 1.84 .96 .155** -.188** -.190** .108** -.039 -.071* 1         
8. Societal benefit: 
Increasing patient 
choice 
2.92 1.70 .97 .163** -.138** -.180** .084** -.067* -.123** .676** 1       
9. Patient benefits 3.27 1.53 .80 .123** -.171** -.147** .067* -.063* -.062* .672** .560** 1     
10. Personal benefits 4.21 1.52 .76 .042 .044 -.163** -.218** .012 -.108** .424** .351** .531** 1   
11. Resistance to 
implement 
6.68 1.77 .85 -.157** .151** .152** -.060* .071* .011 -.566** -.447** -.562** -.477** 1 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01. Reference categories: 3: 0= Not a psychiatrist, 4/5: 0=Working private practice, 6: 0=Non-management position.  
  
Multivariate findings and discussion 
We now run a multivariate OLS regression using SPSS to explain resistance to implement DRGs 
(all variables entered simultaneously, with listwise exclusion of cases with missing values). This 
is shown in Table 2. A multivariate model is necessary because, the socio-demographic and 
occupational variables are not mutually independent and to establish the independent effect of 
each of the perceived benefits. Model 1 looks at background variables only, while model 2 
includes the perceived policy benefits as well. 
In the first model, a number of relatively weak relationships emerge. Male respondents 
are less willing to implement DRG policies. Resistance also increases with age. Psychiatrists are 
considerably less willing to implement DRG policies compared to non-medical mental health care 
professionals such as psychologists and psychotherapists (who are also more often female and 
younger than psychiatrists). Respondents in a managing position are, not surprisingly, more 
willing to implement the policy. We found no effect of whether respondents work in a private 
practice, in an institution, or combining these. Overall, the model’s R
2
 is relatively low, at just 4 
per cent. 
In the second model, we add perceived benefits of the DRG policy. When adding these 
variables, the effect of background variables largely disappears. Age and whether one works as 
a psychiatrist are no longer significant. Males are still significantly less willing, and respondents in 
a management position are more willing to implement the policy. The overall explanatory power 
of the model also increases significantly, to 43 per cent. When respondents think the new policy 
will not be beneficial for care efficiency and care quality, for patients, or for themselves, they are 
more likely to resist its implementation.  
The perceived (absence of) benefits of DRGs for health quality and efficiency is the 
strongest variable in the model, suggesting that professionals resist implementation, because 
they think the policy will not improve quality, nor lower costs, despite official policy discourse of a 
strong connection between these and DRGs. This can be seen when looking at the betas. The 
negative beta of -.266 for societal benefits (care quality and costs) means that, when a 
professional would feel that these societal benefits are 1 point higher, his or her resistance to the 
policy will on average decrease by .266 (measured on the same scale, for instance a 1-5 scale). 
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Hence, the higher the (absolute value of) beta, the more impact a variable has on resistance to 
change.  
Health professionals do not just think about benefits for patients and health in general, 
but also about benefits for themselves in terms of personal gains, status, finances and 
administrative burdens. The parameter for personal benefits is even stronger than the one for 
patient benefits, which is relevant as this is not discussed in policy discourse. Expected effects 
on patient choice appear to be irrelevant in explaining the willingness to implement policy. This 
suggests that mental health professionals do not associate DRG policies with policy initiatives to 
widen and strengthen choice for patients. 
 
Table 2 Multivariate regression analysis: resistance to implement policy 
 Model 1: background variables 
only 
Model 2: Background variables 
and three dimensions of policy 
benefits 
Female -.106** (.120) -.061* (.093) 
Age .105** (.006) .042 (.004) 
Psychiatrist  .127** (.118) .030 (.090) 
Working only in institution .043 (.159) -.029 (.130) 
Working partly in institution.,partly in private 
practice 
.074 (.186) .022 (.148) 
Managing position -.089** (.119) -.085** (.092) 
   
1a. Societal benefits – Costs and quality of 
care 
 -.266** (.035) 
1b. Societal benefits – Client choice  -.053 (.034) 
2. Patient benefits  -.206** (.040) 
3. Personal benefits  -.249** (.035) 
   
Adjusted R
2
 .05** .43** 
N 1055 1055 
Note: Standardized beta coefficients are presented. Standard error in between brackets. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Regression criteria were met (independent residuals, no multicollinearity, no exclusion of outlying cases, Cooks 
distance max. .02 (criterion <1), homoscedasticity and normality criteria met. 
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Discussion 
We quantitatively examined factors that influence the resistance of health care professionals to 
implement new policies. Although some prominent scholars have emphasized the crucial impact 
of resistance of professionals to implement a policy, few have developed and tested a systematic 
explanatory framework. In this study, we have constructed a theoretical model linking three 
perceived benefits of a policy (for society, patients and personal) to resistance to implement 
public policies. This model was tested in a survey of mental health care professionals 
implementing Diagnosis Related Groups in the Netherlands. The model worked adequately in 
that the three dimensions of benefits, together with conventional control variables, explained over 
40% of the variance in resistance.  
One of the main results of the study is that many respondents felt that the DRG-policy 
did not have substantial benefits for society. The perceived absence of benefits of DRGs for 
health quality and efficiency is the strongest variable in the model, suggesting that professionals 
resist implementation, because they think the policy will not improve quality, nor lower costs, 
despite official policy discourse of a strong connection between these and DRGs. Furthermore, 
this is an interesting observation as it contradicts some research on New Public Management 
which argues that business goals, such as efficiency, are almost by definition not welcomed by 
professionals [42]. Conversely, it does not seem that professionals are against these business 
goals as such [43]. Rather the opposite: the mental health care professionals were unwilling to 
use the DRG-policy precisely because they believe it does not help to achieve the business 
goals. This betrays a great concern among mental health professionals about care quality and 
care efficiency. Resistance to implement DRGs can thus not be explained by suggesting health 
professionals do not care about efficiency and the financial bottom line. They are unwilling to 
implement this policy not because it focuses on business goals, but because it will not achieve 
those business goals. For policymakers and change agents implementing policies, this means 
that reducing care costs can indeed be seen as a valuable goal for a new policy. Therefore, such 
policymakers and change agents could more openly state that these are the goals being pursued 
and, further, they can try to include health care professionals in debates on how to achieve these 
goals. 
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A second main finding is that expected effects of the introduction of DRGs on patient 
choice do not have an impact on general willingness to implement DRGs. This suggests health 
professionals see no obvious relation between the system of DRGs and the public service choice 
agenda. Finally, perceived personal benefits have a quite substantial effect in the model. Factors 
such as a fear for more red tape, loss of status and income changes are important in explaining 
resistance to implement a policy. This means it is important to take the effects of new policies on 
the personal situation of health professionals into account when trying to convince them to 
implement the policy, and to also concentrate communication efforts on these aspects, mundane 
as they may be. To date, not much policy implementation research has focused on these 
personal benefits for health care professionals. 
Professionals’ resistance can have serious consequences for the effectiveness of the 
DRG policy, as professionals have an important role in the DRG policy. The most extreme option 
is that professionals refuse to work with the DRG policy. Some Dutch professionals indeed chose 
this option (such as professionals linked to Foundation of DRG-free Practices), but this often 
meant for the patients that their treatment is no longer reimbursed by health care insurers. 
Another option is that, when choosing a DRG, professionals opt for more general product groups 
– such as ‘short treatment’ - instead of product groups which are more easily linked to disorders 
– such as ‘personality disorders’. This could increase patient privacy but diminishes the 
transparency of the DRG system. A third option is that professionals use ‘upcoding’, that is, they 
opt for a DRG which is more expensive than the DRG which is ‘most suitable’ for the patient [28]. 
This is also called DRG creep [44]. This increases the revenues for the health care provider, but 
increases total costs for society. In these and other ways, the behaviour of professionals can 
have serious consequences for the effectiveness of the DRG policy. 
We can link the theoretical framework and findings of this study to the wider literature on 
DRGs, see for instance [12, 13, 45]. First, we found that many professionals felt that the DRG 
policy did not have substantial societal benefits, such as increasing transparency and efficiency. 
Other studies also indicated that DRGs did not have substantial societal benefits [46, 47]. On the 
other hand, there are also studies – mostly US based - that show that introducing DRGs 
increased the efficiency of hospitals [48]. These differences can be due to the various 
circumstances, such as the way in which the DRGs were designed in particular countries and the 
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way they were implemented. The second dimension focused on patient benefits, which were 
relatively meagre according to the professionals surveyed. In a similar vein, Evers [44] noted that 
a pitfall of the DRG system was that patients could receive poorer care quality in order to reduce 
costs. Still, it is important to note that other studies have found no negative effects in quality of 
care [45, 49]. The last dimension focuses on personal benefits. For this dimension, less research 
exists, although some note that DRGs could influence professional status, autonomy and lead to 
moral conflicts [50, 51]. In sum, it seems that DRG-policies do not by definition lead to societal, 
patient, or personal benefits. However, the wider research also shows that DRG-policies can be 
beneficial in some circumstances [45, 49]. 
Research to date have largely focused on objective aspects of DRG-policies. Less 
attention has been paid to the perceptions of professionals implementing the DRG-policy, and 
the related resistance. We have shown that this resistance is important to study, as it could lead 
to among else upcoding and professionals refusing to work with the DRG-policy. We argue that 
the developed framework with three dimensions of perceived benefits is useful because it 
integrates different perspectives on the value and effects of DRGs, rather than focusing on a 
single dimension (such as the benefits for society). We have shown that professionals do 
distinguish between different dimensions of perceived benefits, and that a measurement of 
different dimensions is necessary.  
This study was based on a representative sample of mental health care professionals in 
the Netherlands. This does not mean, however, that results can be decontextualized and without 
caution be applied to other policies or other groups of health professionals. Further tests of the 
provided model are needed. Such tests will need to concentrate on other policies and on other 
groups of health professionals. A comparative approach might work adequately to control for the 
structural characteristics of the health care system, including the degree of central steering in 
national health systems and the extent of public and private involvement in the system. Related 
to this, scholars could study one core problem of DRG-systems in mental health care. That is, 
that it is very difficult – if not impossible – to define homogenous groups of psychiatric patients. 
The diagnosis does not seem to indicate the associated costs and treatment as in somatic care. 
Methodological limitations of this research are those common to all survey-based 
research, and include socially desirable answering behavior, common method bias (no evidence 
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was found in our analysis), and non-response bias (but see the non-response analysis provided 
in the methods section). Our analysis also makes assumptions about the likely direction of 
causality, moving from perceived benefits to willingness to implement. An alternative view would 
be that prior resistance to implement influences how benefits are perceived. To obtain a fuller 
insight in to professionals’ resistance, the findings of current study should be supplemented by 
non-attitude based research looking at actual behaviors of professionals during the course of 
their duties. 
 
Conclusion 
This study provides insights that help to understand why health care professionals resist the 
introduction of DRG-based payment systems. We have shown that it is very important that 
professionals feel that a policy or innovation is beneficial, on multiple dimensions. Policymakers 
could think about ways to improve the perceived added value of a policy. One way could be to 
more intensively communicate the values associated with a policy, highlighting its urgency and 
the desired results. Further, pilots might be initiated before ‘rolling out’ a policy nationwide. This 
could improve the effectiveness of a policy, thereby increasing its perceived value and ultimately 
reducing resistance. 
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Appendix: Measures and corresponding scales 
Table 3 Measures and scales used 
Note: Template words are underlined. Templates allow the researcher to specify an item by replacing general phrases 
with more specific ones that better fit the research context. The templates for “policy” is in this case  “DRG policy”. 
The template for “policy goal” is in this case “more care quality”, “more efficiency” and “more patient choice”. 
Note: R= Reverse-scored item 
Resistance to implement policies 
1. I intend to try to convince employees of the benefits the policy will bring (R) 
2. I intend to put effort into achieving the goals of the policy (R)  
3. I intend to reduce resistance among employees regarding the policy (R) 
4. I intend to make time to implement the policy (R) 
5. I intend to put effort in order to implement the policy successfully (R) 
Societal benefits 
1. I think that the policy, in the long term, will lead to policy goal 1 
2. I think that the policy, in the short term, will lead to policy goal 1 
3. I think that the policy has already led to policy goal 1 
4. Overall, I think that the policy leads to policy goal 1 
Patient benefits 
1. The policy is harmful for my patients privacy (R) 
2. With the policy I can better solve the problems of my patients 
3. The policy is contributing to the welfare of my patients 
4. Because of the policy, I can help patients more efficiently than before 
5. I think that the policy is ultimately favourable for my patients 
Personal benefits 
1. As a result of the policy, I experience positive financial consequences 
2. On the long term, the policy is beneficial for me 
3. I have won little as a result of the introduction of the policy (R) 
4. My future in this job will be limited because of the policy (R) 
5. I am worried I have lost some of my status due to the introduction of the policy (R) 
6. As a result of the policy, I have to do more administrative work (R) 
7. The policy erodes my duty of professional confidentiality (R) 
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